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Abstract
Robotization is an increasingly pervasive feature of our lives. Robots with high 
degrees of autonomy may cause harm, yet in sufficiently complex systems neither 
the robots nor the human developers may be candidates for moral blame. John Dana-
her has recently argued that this may lead to a retribution gap, where the human 
desire for retribution faces a lack of appropriate subjects for retributive blame. The 
potential social and moral implications of a retribution gap are considerable. I argue 
that the retributive intuitions that feed into retribution gaps are best understood as 
deontological intuitions. I apply a debunking argument for deontological intuitions 
in order to show that retributive intuitions cannot be used to justify retributive pun-
ishment in cases of robot harm without clear candidates for blame. The fundamen-
tal moral question thus becomes what we ought to do with these retributive intui-
tions, given that they do not justify retribution. I draw a parallel from recent work 
on implicit biases to make a case for taking moral responsibility for retributive intui-
tions. In the same way that we can exert some form of control over our unwanted 
implicit biases, we can and should do so for unjustified retributive intuitions in cases 
of robot harm.
Keywords Retribution · Retribution gaps · Human–robot interactions · Debunking 
arguments · Moral intuitions · Moral responsibility
“A night that never grows dark for the lightning.”
—Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus
Introduction
Our lives are increasingly affected by robotization. Recent developments in robotics 
and machine learning are initiating a “new generation of systems that rival or exceed 
human capabilities” (Kaplan 2015, 3). Advances in technology of this kind, for 
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example in the form of intelligent military robots (Hellström 2013; Sparrow 2007), 
industrial robots (Solaiman 2017), or self-driving cars (Nyholm and Smids 2016), 
have far-reaching moral, social, and legal consequences. They generate philosophi-
cal questions, such as whether robots can be held morally and legally responsible 
for their actions (Gunkel 2017; Matthias 2004). These questions become especially 
pressing when something goes wrong, such as in the recent case of Elaine Herzberg, 
who was killed by a self-driving car in Arizona in 2018. We are at an early stage 
of understanding human responses to the (potential) products and effects of exten-
sive robotization; yet it is vital that work in this area keeps up with technological 
advances and properly captures their significance.
John Danaher (2016) has recently examined some of the implications of advanced 
and widespread robotization for our attitudes toward punishment and blame in the 
face of perceived wrongdoing in cases involving robots with high degrees of auton-
omy. He warns that a retribution gap may open up when the human desire for retri-
bution is confronted with a lack of appropriate subjects for retributive blame.1 When 
robots cause harm, human beings are wont to seek out culpable targets in order to 
exact retribution—yet none may be found. The potential social and moral impli-
cations of a retribution gap are substantial; it may lead to moral scapegoating and 
could even threaten the rule of law if legal systems fail to accommodate common 
intuitions. In the wake of Herzberg’s death, attacks were reported on self-driving 
cars in apparent retaliation. In a city near Phoenix, people threw rocks at a number 
of self-driving vans that were being tested; they also slashed their tires and generally 
pestered them, for instance by driving right in front of them and suddenly braking 
hard (Romero 2018).
In this paper, I scrutinize several components of the retribution gap argument, 
focusing on those pertaining to retributive intuitions in relation to normative claims. 
The “awkward dance,” as Danaher describes it (2016, 302), between descriptive 
psychology and normative ethics is what is most interesting and at the same time 
most controversial in the retribution gap discussion. I critically examine the so-
called dance, especially in light of debunking work by Wiegman (2017) that targets 
deontological intuitions. I show that deontological intuitions, which are “intuitions 
that are revealed by widespread tendencies to judge or act [independently of] an 
act-consequential evaluation of actions”2 (193), are ultimately at work in Danaher’s 
account.
Empirically informed moral philosophy has witnessed a number of attempts 
to undermine the evidentiary status of moral intuitions (e.g., Kelly 2018; Nich-
ols 2014). If retributivist intuitions and the blame-seeking to which they give rise 
are in fact deontological intuitions, as I argue they are, then one should ask what 
1 The retribution gap can be seen as a subcategory of responsibility gaps, which have been discussed 
at greater length in the literature, and which occur "when computerized, highly adaptive, autonomously 
operating devices, inevitably lead to a partial loss of the operator’s control over the device," (Matthias 
2004, 176). Retribution and responsibility gaps, although related, are nevertheless supposed to be con-
ceptually distinct (Danaher 2016).
2 I have slightly modified Wiegman’s (2017) definition, here and elsewhere.
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debunking those intuitions would mean for the retribution gap. I contend that the 
most pressing and morally significant gap in fact arises between retributive intui-
tions and what one ought to do with them, rather than between those intuitions and 
the unsuccessful attempt to find appropriate targets for blame in the case of robot 
wrongdoings.
When retributive intuitions are properly understood in relation to normative the-
ory, there may be no retribution gap to speak of. Instead, the fundamental question 
becomes what to do with retributive intuitions in cases of robot harm where there 
are no eligible targets for retributive blame. In response to this question, I draw a 
parallel from recent work on implicit biases and moral evaluation to make a case for 
taking moral responsibility—by exerting ecological control—for retributive intui-
tions in cases of robot harm without clear candidates for moral blame. For if these 
retributive intuitions are unjustified, as I show they are, then one must not act on 
them.
The Retribution Gap
In order to understand what the debunking of deontological intuitions means for the 
retribution gap, one must first be clear about how, precisely, the gap emerges. Dana-
her’s (2016) argument for the retribution gap may be summarized as follows: 
(1) Human beings are innate retributivists; when we perceive harm, we seek to 
identify and desire to punish a culpable wrongdoer. This (i.e., retribution) is 
regarded by many moral philosophers as the right theory.
(2) As robotization becomes more ubiquitous in society, and when robots come to 
have high degrees of autonomy, it is likely that these robots will cause more harm 
than they have heretofore done.
(3) People will be seeking targets for retributive blame in these cases.
(4) It is unlikely that either the robots or their makers will be eligible for retributive 
blame.3
(5) Therefore, a retribution gap arises: people want retributive punishment, but they 
fail to find an appropriate subject for the satisfaction of this desire.
(6) Thus, increased robotization will lead to a retribution gap.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in detail each of the six claims. I 
will assume that, aside from the relation between description and prescription that I 
wish to critically examine (as found primarily in claims 1, 3, and 5), the other claims 
hold true—the dynamics are as described by Danaher (2016).
3 Much of Danaher’s (2016) argument ultimately depends on this claim, which is not uncontested (see, 
e.g., Nyholm 2018a, b). It is clear that, if there are always eligible targets for retributive blame in cases of 
robot harm, then there will be no retribution gap. As systems become increasingly autonomous, complex, 
and more substantially embedded in society, however, it stands to reason that targets for retributive blame 
will accordingly become more obscure. I think that this is enough to warrant retribution gap concerns 
(for a defense of retribution-gaps along different lines, see also De Jong 2019).
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The first claim in the argument is that people are innate retributivist, for which 
there is a substantial body of evidence (e.g., Carlsmith and Darley 2008; Jensen 
2010). This is uncontroversial. What is not clear, however, is the nature of the retrib-
utivism with which Danaher is concerned. He defines retributivism as “the belief 
that agents should be punished, in proportion to their level of wrongdoing, because 
they deserve to be punished,” and distinguishes this from retributive blame, which is 
“appropriate when the agent is morally culpable for the harm that occurred” (2016, 
302). He writes of “powerful psychological drives pushing people to locate subjects 
of retributive blame,” and a “general social desire for retribution” (ibid.).
What Danaher appears to be concerned with, and what is the most natural starting 
point in a discussion of people’s desires for retribution, are intuitions—more specifically, 
retributive intuitions. Danaher refers to intuitions directly only once in his paper,4 when 
he acknowledges that doctrines “can sometimes fail to comply with intuitions of retribu-
tive justice” (2016, 307). The psychological nature and process of retributive blame is 
relatively underdeveloped in Danaher’s account. The most straightforward explanation 
of the phenomenon would be that, upon learning of some committed harm, a retribu-
tion intuition arises in an agent. This intuition may then drive the agent to respond with 
some act of retribution—whether by their own hand or indirectly, for instance through 
others. With retributive intuitions identified as the starting point and proper domain for 
the forces that contribute to the retribution gap, it only remains to be said that retributive 
intuitions generally are a species of deontological intuitions (Wiegman 2017).
Danaher is therefore concerned with deontological intuitions, to the extent that 
retributive intuitions contribute to the retribution gap. Although he does not explic-
itly classify retributive intuitions as deontological intuitions, his working definition 
of retributivism (and underlying intuitions) as “the belief that people should be pun-
ished because they deserve it” (Danaher 2016, 305) contrasts squarely with conse-
quentialist theories of punishment (and underlying intuitions) that are typically more 
forward-looking by stressing beneficial outcomes like deterrence (Greene and Cohen 
2004).5 Given that deontological intuitions are “intuitions that are revealed by wide-
spread tendencies to judge or act [independently of] an act-consequential evaluation 
of actions” (Wiegman 2017, 193), these must be involved in Danaher’s account of the 
retribution gap. For, without eligible targets for retributive blame, how could retribu-
tive intuitions pertain to the consequences of punishment? It is implausible that these 
retributive intuitions would inherently involve evaluations of actions in terms of con-
sequences, when a potential consequences-bearing target is missing.6
5 This is the standard account of deontological versus consequentialist theories of punishment, where 
the two are set off against each other. In principle, however, there is no reason why consequentialist 
approaches could not accommodate deontological elements (e.g., those pertaining to the good or the 
right). The consequentialist could, for instance, include in their theory of the good a claim to the effect 
that it is good if evil people suffer (see also Portmore 2011). Thanks to Sven Nyholm for this point.
6 Of course, consequences may be taken as something larger and nonspecific here, for instance as conse-
quences for society at large, should some form of retribution (without target) occur. This, however, seems 
to stretch retributive intuitions beyond recognition. It also goes against Danaher’s (2016) point that, when 
4 Two other instances where he explicitly refers to intuitions involve explanations of the work of others.
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The self-confessedly problematic aspect of Danaher’s first claim is its second part. 
Here, he adds that “many moral and legal philosophers believe that this is the right 
thing to do” to the idea that when there is perceived causal responsibility for harm, 
people attach retributive blame (2016, 301). One would have expected the normative 
claim about retribution to appear at the very end of the overall argument, in order to 
give weight to the retribution gap as something that is not merely a description of 
people’s psychological responses to cases where harm has been caused that cannot 
facilely be attributed to an agent. Instead, the normative claim that retributivism is 
justified is affixed to the beginning of Danaher’s argument. That the two—retribu-
tive intuitions and the justification of retribution—can and should be separated is at 
the heart of my critique. I will return to this idea shortly.
One final point must be made, which is that focusing on the so-called descrip-
tive-prescriptive dance does not cut arbitrarily into the argument for a retribution 
gap. Danaher writes that “the combination of this normative stance with the general 
social desire for punishment is what makes the retribution gap worthy of our atten-
tion,” and, rather more forcefully, that it is “the potential mismatch between the gen-
eral desire for retribution and the specific requirements of retributive moral theory” 
that makes the retribution gap “so disturbing” (2016, 302). It is crucial, therefore, 
that the reasoning behind this aspect of the account is sound.
Although it is not strictly the last, Danaher’s fifth claim—that if there are no 
appropriate subjects of retributive punishment to be found by retribution-seeking 
agents, a retribution gap emerges—does most of the work in the final stage of the 
argument.7 In relation to this fifth claim, Danaher is attentive to one potential criti-
cism, which goes as follows. A moral retributivist believes that people should be 
punished because and when they deserve it; therefore, there cannot be a gap—for if 
there is no suitable target for retributive blame, then no one ultimately goes unpun-
ished who deserves to be punished (2016, 305). Danaher grants that this view is cor-
rect, at least from the perspective of a retributivist, but insists that this does not mean 
that there are no moral or normative concerns that arise from the gap. He goes on to 
argue for three normative concerns related to the retribution gap, which “should be 
of interest to everyone” (ibid.). These are: (1) an increased risk of moral scapegoat-
ing, (2) a potential threat to the rule of law, and (3) a strategic opening for those who 
oppose retributivism. I will return to some of these implications later.
Since, as I have argued, deontological intuitions are at work in the formation of 
the retribution gap, it is important to assess their nature and meaning, particularly in 
relation to retribution as a normative theory.
7 The sixth and last claim simply relates the fifth back to robotization.
Footnote 6 (continued)
it comes to the desire for retribution, people tend to want to see individuals punished. Thanks to an anon-
ymous reviewer for pushing me to further develop this argument.
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Debunking arguments generally serve to “clear the epistemic ground: they show 
who owes a plausible justification for their beliefs in the second round of inquiry” 
(Sauer 2018, 3). The application of debunking arguments to moral theory has a 
relatively short but lively history (e.g., Kahane 2011; Singer 2005; Street 2006). 
I will focus on debunking within the purview of the kind of intuitions that I have 
argued underlie the retribution gap, namely deontological intuitions. On that subject, 
Greene (2008) set the stage with his dual-process theory of moral judgment, accord-
ing to which consequentialist intuitions are produced by more cognitive processes, 
while deontological intuitions—including retributive intuitions—are produced by 
more emotional or ‘alarm-bell’ processes.8
Whether Greene’s dual-process theory allows him to successfully debunk deon-
tology has been questioned (Berker 2009; Sauer 2012). A more promising approach 
is provided by Wiegman (2017), who extends the project of debunking deontologi-
cal intuitions while building on Greene’s groundwork.9 His argument is intended to 
sever the evidentiary connection between a particular type of deontological intui-
tions—retributive intuitions—and the principles that it appears to support. In my 
view, Wiegman’s account has greater sophistication and viability than Greene’s, and 
is more directly translatable to the current discussion of the retribution gap.10
Instead of explaining the difference between deontological and consequential-
ist intuitions in terms of the difference between the relative influences of emotion 
and cognition,11 Wiegman (2017) captures the difference by distinguishing prospec-
tive from non-prospective processes, where non-prospective processes bestow non-
derivative value on actions—that is, value which does not derive from the action’s 
consequences. He proposes the following debunking argument, which is worth quot-
ing at length:
Suppose that some non-prospective processes were selected for their fitness-
enhancing consequences. If these processes also cause deontological intuitions 
because of their consequences, then the function of non-prospective processes 
(producing good outcomes) disconnects them from the states of affairs that 
intuitions report (that actions have value aside from their outcomes). (201)
8 Greene assumes that, within the domain of punishment, "deontological" and "retributivist" are essen-
tially interchangeable, even though they are conceptually distinct (2008, 21). To my knowledge, equating 
the two in this way has not been challenged in the literature—at least not within the domain of punish-
ment. This adds further weight to my claim that Danaher is concerned with deontological intuitions as 
much as with retributive intuitions.
9 Wiegman calls his account a "friendly amendment" to Greene’s dual-process theory of moral judgment 
(2017, 194).
10 It must be noted that, while I have selected Wiegman’s (2017) debunking account because it appears 
to me to be the most successful and pertinent, there may well be other ways to undermine retributive 
intuitions.
11 As, for instance, done by Greene (2008).
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The evolution of non-prospective processes, therefore, gives us an undercutting 
defeater for deontological intuitions. That is, it provides an evidential defeating 
argument that dissolves the evidentiary link between psychological processes and 
the states of affairs that they represent.
In relation to retributive intuitions specifically, Wiegman offers anger as an exam-
ple of a non-prospective process, since it places non-derivative value on actions. He 
delineates a retributivist principle R that is responsible for retributive intuitions:
R: The value (or justification) of an act of punishment is not (or not only) 
derived from the consequences of the act (or the practice) of punishment.
Wiegman then provides an evolutionary account of anger in relation to punishment 
and cooperation, in order to show that “deterrence (or any other consequence of 
punishment) cannot be an indicator of any value that a punishment might have aside 
from its consequences,” so that “the putative evolutionary function of anger in the 
production of retributive intuitions serves as an undercutting defeater for those intui-
tions with respect to R” (2017, 205). The evidentiary connection between retributive 
intuitions and the retributive principle R is thus severed.
Given that an emotion like anger produces retributive intuitions as a result of the 
biological consequences of those intuitions, the intuitions themselves turn out to be 
poor indicators of non-derivative value (cf. Street 2006). Deontological intuitions 
more generally may still have non-derivative value, but they cannot be used as (nor-
mative) evidence for or a justification of such value.
Debunking the Retribution Gap
Now it is time to combine what has been said about deontological debunking and 
the retribution gap, in order to gauge what the former means for the latter.
What must be noticed first and foremost is that Wiegman’s principle R lines up 
neatly with Danaher’s conception of retribution and the consequences of retributive 
intuitions for cases of robot-caused harm. It follows from Wiegman’s account that 
deontological retributive intuitions in cases of robot harm are not a good indicator 
of the non-derivative value of punishment. One cannot derive normative conclusions 
from these intuitions.
Danaher is aware that the retribution gap as he describes it leaves room for 
non-retributive approaches to punishment. In one sense, then, Wiegman’s 
debunking account could be used to argue for just such an approach: retributive 
intuitions cannot be used as evidence for the non-derivative value of punishment, 
so that we ought to look elsewhere instead—to consequentialist theories of pun-
ishment, for instance.12 This is hasty, however. The retribution gap opens up pre-
cisely because of the interplay between descriptive psychological processes and 
normative theory, so that one cannot arrive at the ‘end’ of the gap after it has 
been opened up, so to speak, in order to then speculate—as if independently from 
12 But see also footnote 2.
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the process itself—about part of what caused the gap in the first place, namely 
normative theory. Yet this is what Danaher appears to do.
What seems to be missing from the retribution gap account as it stands is what 
may be called a metaethical stance; a position from which to connect the descrip-
tive to the normative in a more coherent way. Consider Danaher’s reference to the 
fact that there are many legal and moral philosophers who hold that the “retribu-
tive attitude” is correct (2016, 299). This broad statement of the normative sta-
tus of retribution actually does very little work in Danaher’s argument for the 
retribution gap, which is perhaps surprising given the emphasis on the relation 
(“dance”) between descriptive and normative theory. All the same, in light of 
Wiegman’s debunking of deontological intuitions, it will not do to simply intro-
duce normative conclusions concerning retribution, for there may be substantive 
differences in how those conclusions are reached. More specifically, if some of 
the arguments of the theorists that Danaher adduces rely on the ostensible evi-
dentiary connection between retributive intuitions and the non-derivative value 
of punishment, then these, as I have shown, are inadmissible. Normative conclu-
sions regarding the retributive attitude therefore cannot be assumed beforehand; 
they require careful argumentation and clarification when it comes to the role 
played by retributive intuitions in light of their evidential status.
It is beyond my scope here to dissect the arguments of the philosophers that are 
introduced by Danaher in support of the normative appropriateness of retribution. 
This would also give them more attention than Danaher does himself. Neverthe-
less, given that the blanket use of retributive intuitions as evidence for retributive 
theories of punishment has been shown to no longer be feasible, the case for a 
retribution gap will be better off without theories that rely on this logic. In any 
case, in the end, it is not clear what role—if any—normative theory plays in the 
retribution gap, for intuitions about retribution may lead to blame attribution and 
desire for punishment entirely independently of any formal normative theory of 
punishment. Purely descriptively, people may experience retribution intuitions in 
the case of robot harm, people may find no one specific to blame, and people 
may hence be left with an unsatiated retribution desire. In other words, normative 
theory does not play a causal role in the retribution gap.
If it is wrong to use retributive intuitions as evidence for non-derivative the-
ories of punishment, then this also applies to cases of robot harm. Conversely, 
this means that the evidentiary fissure between retributive intuitions and norma-
tive theory is not just informative in cases of robot harm, but will extend to any 
instance where retributive intuitions are sought to be mapped onto particular 
states of affairs. Interestingly, Danaher writes that, if no appropriate subjects of 
blame are to be found in cases of robot harm, then “moral retributivists could 
respond [to this] by saying that ordinary folk simply need to recalibrate their intu-
itive judgments” (2016, 308). It is not clear why he singles out moral retributiv-
ists. If retributive intuitions cannot be used to support retributivism about punish-
ment, then (1) everyone needs to recalibrate their intuitions, to the extent that 
they stand in an untenable relation to matters of fact, and (2) this is—or should 
be—as much of a concern to non-retributivists about punishment.
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It takes a description of the retribution gap to be able to plug it. Nevertheless, if 
the biggest source of worry—the major form of risk—in cases of robot harm centers 
on an unanswered or unanswerable set of retributive intuitions, as I think it does,13 
then what matters above all else is that these intuitions are addressed. Part of doing 
that means understanding their nature and the purpose they serve.
Moral Responsibility
At the very least, retributive intuitions cannot be used to justify retributive punish-
ment. Yet, although retribution is not justified by the retributive intuitions that peo-
ple experience in cases of robot harm, those intuitions still remain. The discussion 
of the retribution gap, after all, is sparked by their presence and prevalence. This 
leaves us with the practical problem of what to do with them—the fundamental 
problem, as I understand it, behind the retribution gap.14 To be clear: retribution in 
cases of robot harm without an identifiable target for retribution might still be justi-
fied. It simply cannot be justified on the basis of retributive intuitions. One might 
wonder, then, what retributive intuitions are good for. If they merely point toward, 
but cannot justify, acts of retribution, then prudence would recommend that the intu-
itions be ignored—at least until they are deemed justified. For the ways in which 
people respond to cases of robot harm without clear targets for blame need to be 
justified, especially when this involves retribution. However, as soon as a theory of 
punishment is found to justify particular responses in these cases, retributive intui-
tions become superfluous. This is because there would be no good reason to act on 
one’s intuitions rather than to act according to the normative demands stipulated by 
a justified theory of punishment (cf. Unger 1996).
I want to take it one step further. Before I do so, it must be noted that worries 
about the retribution gap may turn out to be overblown, once we understand the 
agency of robots in terms of human–robot collaborations rather than as (purely) 
independent of human agency (Nyholm 2018a, b). Let us nevertheless assume that, 
as postulated by the retribution gap argument, there are and will be cases of robot 
harm where targets for moral blame are not to be found even though people search 
for them.15 It seems highly unlikely to me that retribution is the appropriate response 
in situations where there is truly no target for retributive blame. Danaher’s definition 
of retribution as “the belief that agents should be punished, in proportion to their 
level of wrongdoing, because they deserve to be punished,” and of retributive blame 
as “appropriate when the agent is morally culpable for the harm that occurred” 
13 And Danaher appears to agree, in speaking of the "desire for retribution [that] will go unfulfilled" 
(2015, 305).
14 The argument that some (kinds of) moral intuitions are, upon further analysis, not justified—and 
therefore are not to be given weight in moral theory—is not new. Recently, for example, Greene (2013) 
has argued that deontological moral intuitions fail to track morally relevant features of moral dilemmas, 
so that one’s moral theory—in Greene’s case, a utilitarian metamorality—ought not to be based on them. 
(But see Kraaijeveld and Sauer (2019) for a critique of this approach.).
15 See also footnote 3.
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(2016, 302) literally point toward nothing in cases of robot harm when there are 
no identifiable moral agents. This is, of course, part of the problem outlined by the 
retribution gap. If we combine the notion of pointing-to-nothing, however, with the 
idea that retributive intuitions cannot by themselves justify retribution, then we have 
at least a prima facie case against giving any weight to acting on retributive intui-
tions in the scenarios stipulated to give rise to a retribution gap.
The case for disregarding retributive intuitions is further strengthened by the 
fact that acting on them in cases of robot harm is likely to lead to morally wrong 
behavior like moral scapegoating.16 When the Arizonans attacked self-driving cars, 
one cannot say with certainty that what spurred them on were retributive intuitions. 
However, the case is suggestive.17 Consider the facts. Elaine Herzberg was struck 
and killed by a self-driving car operated by Uber; the human test driver (who was 
not operating the vehicle, but who was there to take control should this be neces-
sary) was a woman named Rafaela Vasquez; and the car itself was a Volvo (Stilgoe 
2019). The self-driving cars that the Arizonans sabotaged were operated by Waymo, 
a former Google project; the emergency backup drivers were, one must presume, not 
Rafaela Vasquez; and the cars themselves were different (not even the same model) 
from the one that struck Herzberg (Romero 2018). All in all, then, none of the rel-
evant actors were the same across the two cases. More specifically, none of the eli-
gible targets for moral blame—the operating company, the human drivers, or the car 
producers—were the same. Putting aside questions about the particular form that 
retribution took in this case,18 one is hard-pressed to find a justification for retribu-
tion here. In light of Danaher’s definition of retributivism as the belief that agents 
should be punished because and to the extent that they deserve it,19 it appears to me 
that none of the targets in the city near Phoenix were eligible candidates for moral 
blame. After all, none had a causal connection to the original accident. The case 
seems to illustrate the kind of moral scapegoating that can result from retribution 
gap dynamics.
To the extent that we are all subject to retributive intuitions in these cases (if the 
scope of the retribution gap is as wide as it has been described to be), it seems that 
we would do best not to yield to their influence. If I am right—if we ought to dis-
count retributive intuitions in cases of robot harm without targets for moral blame—
then this might seem like an uphill battle, insofar as intuitions are automatic, knee-
jerk responses beyond conscious control (e.g., Greene 2008; Haidt 2001). It may 
appear that we are stuck with them and, relatedly, that we are not responsible for 
them. While intuitions—including those pertaining to retribution—appear to be 
beyond direct control, however, they need not be characterized as beyond any form 
16 Danaher writes that, "[i]f there is a deep human desire to find appropriate targets for retributive blame, 
but none really exist, then there is a danger that people will try to fulfill that desire in inappropriate ways. 
Or, perhaps even more serious than this, that other social actors will take advantage of the desire in inap-
propriate ways" (2016, 307).
17 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I discuss this case.
18 Attacking cars on the street, thus also putting human drivers and pedestrians at risk, is highly unlikely 
to be justified, even if some other form of retribution might be.
19 This is a fairly standard definition of retributivism (cf. Hanna 2018).
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of control. Railton (2014) has argued, for instance, that intuitions are part of a flex-
ible and sophisticated learning system, which opens up the possibility of honing 
them over time in order that they may (better) guide decision and action. Even with-
out such a neuroscientific approach, however, there are indirect ways in which retrib-
utive intuitions can be brought within the realm of individual control.
A parallel may be drawn here to recent work on implicit biases and moral charac-
ter. Implicit biases are “discriminatory biases based on implicit attitudes or implicit 
stereotypes,” which are considered to be especially problematic because they tend to 
result in behavior that “diverges from a person’s avowed or endorsed beliefs or prin-
ciples” (Greenwald and Krieger 2006). When characterized as unintentional, una-
voidable, automatic associations, these biases look to be paradigmatically beyond 
an individual’s control (Holroyd 2012). Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that 
people are still morally responsible in some ways for their implicit biases (Holroyd 
et al. 2017). Holroyd and Kelly (2016) have built on the work of Andy Clark (2007; 
Clark and Chalmers 1998) to argue that we have ecological control over implicit 
biases, which is sufficient for moral evaluation. An individual takes ecological con-
trol “when they reflectively decide to manipulate their mental states or environment, 
so as to shape their cognitive processes” (Holroyd and Kelly 2016, 119). More pre-
cisely, what Holroyd and Kelly have in mind is:
…the recursive use of control to enhance and heighten control itself. An agent 
can do this by fine-tuning the role of subsystems which in turn help produce 
dispositions and behaviors that can better fulfil her more distal goals, thus 
allowing her to better behave in ways that more precisely reflect her intentions, 
and more crisply conform to her considered ideals and values. Ultimately, a 
person can calibrate subsystems that guide behavior until eventually they oper-
ate, on their own, in precisely the way she wants them to operate, even when 
she is not consciously and explicitly attending to them. (2016, 119)
One requirement of taking ecological control in this way is that an individual is at 
least sometimes able to reflectively control their behavior (Holroyd and Kelly 2016).
Retributive intuitions in cases of robot harm appear to me to be less elusive than 
the implicit biases targeted by Holroyd and Kelly (2016), and individuals are cer-
tainly capable (at least in principle) of reflecting on their intuitions and controlling 
their behavior. That is to say, if implicit biases are legitimate subjects for moral eval-
uation by virtue of being susceptible to ecological control by agents, then so are 
retributive intuitions. And if retributive intuitions are unjustified in cases of robot 
harm where there are no candidates for moral blame, then one ought not to let them 
guide one’s behavior. One must not be led by them to acts of retribution. Danaher 
writes that the implications of the retribution gap will vary “depending on your pre-
ferred theory of punishment” (2016, 307). I propose instead that what ultimately 
matters is the control that you exert over the retributive intuitions for which you are 
morally responsible.
One way of wielding ecological control over implicit bias is through implementa-
tion intentions. Implementation intentions are “if–then plans” that complement goal 
intentions by identifying “(a) a good opportunity to act,” and “(b) a suitable goal-
directed response to that opportunity” (Webb et  al. 2012, 15). Holroyd and Kelly 
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offer the following example of how implementation intentions can be used to over-
come an implicit bias: “[A]n individual seeking to exert control over her implicit 
biases might deliberately repeat to herself, ‘If I see a Black face, I will think ‘safe’,’ 
practicing this line of thought enough that it becomes routine and automatic, thus 
defeating her implicit racial bias” (2016, 122).
In the case of retributive intuitions, this approach might go as follows. The goal 
intention should be to disregard retributive intuitions in cases of robot harms with-
out targets for blame. To this end, an individual might specify:
(a) “If I learn of robot harm but cannot identify a target for blame…”20
(b) “…then I will think that retribution is not the appropriate response.”21
Through implementation intentions, a strong link—a new association—may be 
created between the specified opportunities and responses, “so that the planned 
response ensues swiftly and effortlessly (i.e., relatively automatically) when the 
opportunity is encountered” (Webb et al. 2012, 15). This is a practical and feasible 
way, then, for one to take control over retributive intuitions, and it is my contention 
that one ought to do so. If retributive intuitions do not justify retribution in cases of 
robot harm without targets for moral blame, then one must not act on them.22 One 
way to avoid acting on them is to take ecological control of them. Recognizing that 
this is warranted is an important first step.
Conclusion
I have argued that the retributivist intuitions underlying the retribution gap are prop-
erly understood as deontological intuitions, and I have applied a debunking argu-
ment to show that retributive intuitions cannot be used to justify retribution in cases 
of robot harm without eligible targets for moral blame. The upshot of this has been 
that, when it comes to robot harm, the most pressing gap in fact arises not between 
retributive intuitions and unsuccessful attempts to find appropriate targets for moral 
blame (as in Danaher’s account), but rather between retributive intuitions and how 
we act on them. The crucial task thus becomes to determine what we should do in 
light of the retributive intuitions we experience in cases of robot harm without clear 
candidates for moral blame. I have drawn a parallel from recent work on implicit 
biases and moral evaluation to suggest one potential course of action. Just as we 
should shoulder responsibility for our implicit biases, we ought also to take moral 
responsibility for our retributive intuitions. By exercising ecological control over 
20 This ’if’ may be further broken down into an ’if’ and a ’then’: "If I learn of robot harm… then I 
will try to identify a target for blame." Subsequently, "If I cannot identify a target…" will complete the 
sequence.
21 This is just one example of an if–then plan; it may be formulated in different ways and for different 
situations, as long as it reinforces the relevant overarching goal intention.
22 Retribution may still be justified in other ways, as I have previously pointed out; just not on the basis 
of retributive intuitions in these cases.
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them and forming implementation intentions, for instance, we can and must ensure 
that we do not engage in retribution on the basis of these unjustified intuitions.
I hope that there will be no more cases like Elaine Herzberg’s. Should similar 
events transpire in the future—that is, should robots with high degrees of autonomy 
cause harm—then retribution might be a morally appropriate response, perhaps even 
when there are no explicit targets for moral blame. But our retributive intuitions 
about them will not point us in the right direction.
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